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ABSTRACT
In United States v. Kramer, the Eighth Circuit upheld a
two-level sentence enhancement for a defendant who made
calls and sent text messages from a cellphone to a minor in
order to lure her across state lines for criminal sexual
activity. This enhancement was based on a provision in the
United States Sentencing Guidelines that incorporates the
definition of “computer” from the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act. The broad language of that statute encompasses
not only computers—in the plainest sense—and cellphones,
but also a myriad of other devices such as automobiles
equipped with GPS navigation. In contrast to the
sentencing context, this conception of many electronics
devices as “computers” does not extend into issues related
to searches. There, courts tend to permit broader
examination of cellphones and other electronic devices in
searches incident to arrest, despite the general protection
computers are usually afforded under the Fourth
Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
In a recent case, United States v. Kramer, 1 the Eighth Circuit
held that a two-level sentencing enhancement was appropriate
when a defendant used a cellphone to induce a minor to cross state
lines for criminal sexual activity. This enhancement applied
because Kramer’s cellphone was deemed to qualify as a computer
under the relevant statutory definition of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act. 2 This definition is so encompassing that Steve
Wozniak’s somewhat flippant claim, “[e]verything has a computer
in it nowadays,” 3 becomes a troubling reality for many criminal
defendants. Given the realities of how this class of crimes is
committed and the sweeping definition above, effectively all
defendants sentenced for such crimes will be eligible for the
sentence enhancement. In contrast, computers—as traditionally
conceived—are offered unique protection from searches under the
Fourth Amendment. Under searches incident to arrest and those
pursuant to a warrant, computer searches must be narrowly
tailored. This double reading of the word “computer”—expansive
for sentencing purposes and narrow for Fourth Amendment
purposes—reflects the fog which plagues courts trying to apply
1

631 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2011).
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(1) (2006).
3
Mark Millian, Apple's Steve Wozniak: 'We've lost a lot of control', CNN
TECH (Dec. 8, 2010, 12:16 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-08/
tech/steve.wozniak.computers_1_computer-whiz-computer-history-museumapple-shares?_s=PM:TECH.
2
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traditional principles or older statutes to our rapidly evolving
technology.
I. THE WORD “COMPUTER” AND SENTENCING
A common dictionary definition of “computer” is any “device
that computes, especially a programmable electronic machine that
performs high-speed mathematical or logical operations or that
assembles, stores, correlates, or otherwise processes information.” 4
This definition encompasses essentially all portable electronics—
including iPods, smartphones, e-readers and iPads—as well as
many microwaves and televisions. However, in common usage,
“computer” generally intends either a laptop or desktop PC.
Generally, most people think a computer is a device with a full
QWERTY keyboard designed to be typed on at length. 5
Considering a more expansive definition than the intuitive one
outlined above, the borders of where a modern device stops being a
computer in any meaningful sense of the word is when a user
cannot use the device to connect to the Internet.
The United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) include an
enhancement of two levels if the “offense involved the use of a
computer . . . to (A) persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate
the travel of, the minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct; or
(B) entice, encourage, offer, or solicit a person to engage in
prohibited sexual conduct with the minor.” 6 The U.S. Sentencing
4

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY.
The increasing adoption of tablet devices, including the iPad and
Microsoft Surface, shows some of the difficulty in defining “computer” in a way
that is acceptable everyone. Some call these products halfway between a laptop
and a smartphone. Michael Arrington, The Unauthorized TechCrunch iPad
Review, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 2, 2010), http://techcrunch.com (calling the iPad a
“New category of device”). Others deride them as oversized smartphones.
Matthew Shaer, iPad nothing more than an oversized Apple iPhone: Motorola,
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR: HORIZONS (Dec. 21, 2010),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/Horizons.
6
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2G1.3 (b)(3) (2013). Similar
enhancements—albeit not always with identical language—appear in USSG §§
2A3.1 (“Criminal Sexual Abuse” or Attempt), 2A3.2 (Statutory Rape or
Attempt), 2A3.3 (“Criminal Sexual Abuse of a Ward” or Attempt), 2A3.4
(“Abusive Sexual Contact” or Attempt), 2G2.1 (Creation of Child Pornography),
5

476

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 8:4

Guidelines incorporate the definition of “computer” in the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). “‘Computer’ has the
meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1).” 7 In turn,
the term ‘computer’ means an electronic, magnetic,
optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data
processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or
storage functions, and includes any data storage
facility or communications facility directly related
to or operating in conjunction with such device, but
such term does not include an automated typewriter
or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or
other similar device. 8
A cellphone is not a typewriter, calculator, or similar device.
The deciding factor in the CFAA analysis has to do with the
storage capacity. Some typewriters have a one line memory and
most four function calculators can remember a single number but
beyond that they rely on the user to supply data and processing
power. Even the most rudimentary cellphone available on the
market today qualifies as a computer under the CFAA due to its
ability to, at a minimum, store a call history and list of contacts.
The Seventh Circuit adopted this reasoning and spoke in even
broader terms, stating that “[e]very cell phone and cell tower is a
‘computer’ under this statute's definition; so is every iPod, every
wireless base station in the corner coffee shop, and many another
gadget.” 9 One commentator expands on the category of “many
another gadget [sic]” which “can include coffeemakers, microwave
ovens, watches, telephones, children's toys, MP3 players,
refrigerators, heating and air-conditioning units, radios, alarm
clocks, televisions, and DVD players, in addition to more
traditional computers like laptops or desktop computers.” 10
2G2.2 (Trafficking in Child Pornography), 2G2.6 (“Child Exploitation
Enterprises”), 2G3.1 (“Importing, Mailing, or Transporting Obscene Matter”),
and 2H3.1 (“Interception of Communications”).
7
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2G1.3 (2012), Note 1, Definitions.
8
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(1).
9
U.S. v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2005).
10
Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1577-1578 (2010) (footnote omitted).
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As a practical matter, there is a question of how some of the
broader instances above could actually trigger the USSG
computer-use enhancement. How, for example, could a
coffeemaker be used to lure a child across state lines for immoral
purposes? Some hypotheticals, however, are not so farfetched. One
not addressed in any published case thus far would be the use of a
modern automobile to transport a minor across state lines, absent
the use of any other computer. The myriad of computerized
controls, not to mention built-in GPS devices, inherent in a newer
vehicle renders it a “computer” under the CFAA. As such, the
individual who used such a car to transport a child across state
lines for immoral purposes could be subject to the 2-level
enhancement of USSG § 2G1.3 (b)(3) as was the defendant in
Kramer. If an attempt were made by a U.S. Attorney to seek the
enhancement, the intuitive understanding that cars and computers
differ significantly, is likely to prevail, causing the enhancement to
be denied.
II. COMPUTERS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
There are two general streams of jurisprudence addressing
searches: searches pursuant to a warrant and searches incident to
arrest. The latter—searches performed in the context of an arrest—
generally offer far less protection for suspects than the former. In
both situations, however, computers are treated very differently
from cell phones and similar devices.
A. Warrant Searches
The general rule governing searches is that a search of a
person’s effects or papers requires a warrant. 11 The Fourth
Amendment requires that warrants are written “particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.” 12 This protection ensures that warrant searches are strictly
limited to the scope of the warrant, even going so far to limit what
11
12

See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id.
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sort of data the police can search for on a computer.
Some courts attempt to resolve the limits of warrant computer
searches by utilizing traditional ideas in Fourth Amendment law,
especially the closed container doctrine, which prohibits
warrantless searches of a closed container. 13
In applying these traditional ideas to computers, a prosecutor in
the case U.S. v. Crist argued that a defendant’s entire computer
should be treated as a single closed container. The Middle District
of Pennsylvania did not accept the U.S. Attorney’s reasoning. “A
hard drive is not analogous to an individual disk. Rather, a hard
drive is comprised of many platters, or magnetic data storage units,
mounted together. Each platter, as opposed to the hard drive in its
entirety, is analogous to a single disk as discussed in Runyan.” 14
The court relied on the technical aspects of hard drive construction,
which offered an avenue of limiting the search.
With advents in data storage technology, however, this limit
will do little good going forward. The storage on many newer
computers, and on all cellphones, is flash-based rather than platterbased. 15 While similar reasoning may be applied—multiple chips
in a flash hard drive and multiple platters in a traditional hard
drive—some smaller devices, like cellphones, use flash chips for
their storage. Crist’s reasoning could also protect, for example, a
car’s GPS history information if the warrant is only written to
permit searching the interior of the car for specific items or classes
of items. For that matter, a warrant authorizing a search for any
kind of item—that is, physical object—may not permit any search
of the car’s computer systems or GPS history since digital data is
not an object. 16
13

See generally U.S. v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2009).
U.S. v. Crist, 627 F.Supp.2d 575, 586 (2008, M.D. Penn.) (citing U.S. v.
Runyan, 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001)).
15
One example is Apple’s Macbook Air which, since 2010, is only
available with flash hard drives. As time goes on, the list of potential examples
of this kind of storage in laptops grows prodigiously.
16
Courts addressing GPS data generally do so in the context of tracking
units placed on cars by police officers. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct
945 (2012). As such, courts have not addressed this information/object
distinction directly but it could be leveraged by defendants seeking to exclude
some information.
14
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A better rubric under which to analyze warrant searches of
computers is offered by U.S. v. Carey. 17 In that case, an officer
searching a computer came upon an image of child pornography.
Instead of stopping for a modification of the warrant, the officer
continued to search the computer for child pornography. “The
warrant authorized the officer to search any file because ‘any file
might well have contained information relating to drug crimes and
the fact that some files might have appeared to have been graphics
files would not necessarily preclude them from containing such
information.’” 18 When the search was challenged, the court found
that the first incidence of child pornography was a licit find
because it was in digital plain view, but the remainder resulted
from the officer’s indifference to the warrant. “The Supreme Court
has instructed, ‘the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a
general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges.’” 19 Warrant searches must
be limited not only to the places the warrant allows but also to the
thing to be found.
Despite the use of more traditional categories, including the
plain view and closed container doctrines, some courts have
attempted to extend general search protections over computers and
other electronics. In United States v. Arnold, the district court held:
[T]he information contained in a laptop and in
electronic storage devices renders a search of their
contents substantially more intrusive than a search
of the contents of a lunchbox or other tangible
object. A laptop and its storage devices have the
potential to contain vast amounts of information.
People keep all types of personal information on
computers, including diaries, personal letters,
medical information, photos and financial records. 20

17

172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1272.
19
Id. at 1272 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466
(1971)).
20
United States v. Arnold, 454 F.Supp.2d 999, 1003–1004 (C.D.Cal. 2006)
reversed by U.S. v. Aronld, 523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008). The appeal was
18
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The decision in Arnold shows that some judges are increasingly
aware of the broad sweep permissive electronics searches would
make into the private lives of individuals who may well have done
nothing wrong.
B. Automobile Exception
Despite the traditional protection against searches of closed
containers, cell phones may be “opened” under the automobile
exception. 21 The jurisprudence addressing searches of cellphones is
generally centered on phones found in automobiles, where
longstanding rules permit their search despite the special protection
generally afforded to computers. The limits of this exception are
drawn by probable cause and “not defined by the nature of the
container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, the
exception is defined by the object of the search and the places in
which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.” 22
This automobile exception is similar to the general exception to
the privacy right that is triggered when an individual is arrested.
[T]he police may also examine the contents of any
containers found within the passenger compartment,
for if the passenger compartment is within reach of
the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within
his reach. Such a container may, of course, be
searched whether it is open or closed, since the
justification for the search is not that the arrestee
has no privacy interest in the container, but that the
lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of
any privacy interest the arrestee may have. 23
The application of this exception, however, treats cellphones and
computers quite differently. While both have been shoehorned into
the legal framework of the closed container doctrine, computers
decided on the grounds that the search occurred at a border where warrantless
searches are widely permitted.
21
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
22
Id. at 824.
23
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
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have been exempted from the automobile exception but cellphones
have not.
The Tenth Circuit has explicitly exempted computers from the
automobile exception. In U.S. v. Burgess, 24 the Court analyzed a
search of a defendant’s motorhome, which revealed marijuana,
cocaine, a laptop, and an external hard drive. 25 In analyzing
whether the discovery, and subsequent search, of the computer was
licit, the court refused to follow the government’s simple
“syllogism”: (1) the expected privacy of the contents of a computer
is like that of a briefcase; (2) the automobile exception permits
searches of briefcases, even if locked, found in automobiles given
probable cause; hence (3) police may—given probable cause—
search computers found in automobiles. 26
The Burgess court did not disagree that the syllogism was
formally valid, but clarified that the treatment of computers as
closed containers was done “to emphasize the high expectation of
privacy for” computers and “not to permit promiscuous searches
under the automobile exception.” 27 In dicta, the court emphasized
that computers hold much information about an individual’s life,
very little of which would be relevant for criminal investigation.
Accordingly, a warrantless search of a computer would be like a
warrantless search of “relevant documents so intermingled with
irrelevant documents that they cannot feasibly be sorted at the
site.” 28 While officers may seize such papers for evaluation
pursuant to a search warrant granted by a magistrate when they
cannot feasibly search them on site, “[t]he magistrate should then
require officers to specify in a warrant which type of [documents]
are sought.” 29 Under similar reasoning, computers would be
exempted from the automobile exception. 30
24

576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1082-83.
26
Id. at 1088 citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991)
(confirming the applicability of the automobile exception to locked briefcases).
27
U.S. v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoted in Burgess,
576 F.3d at 1089).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
The Tenth Circuit ultimately punted on the issue, despite much
discussion, because “[i]nteresting as the issue may be, we need not now resolve
25
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Implicit in some courts’ dicta is the idea that computers are not
subject to the automobile exception. For example the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Missouri ruled, in an unpublished
opinion, on a criminal defendant’s motion to suppress information
found on his cellphone after it was discovered in an automobile
search an officer conducted after the defendant’s arrest. “The Court
concludes that the automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement gave Officer Hilburn's [sic]
latitude to search defendant's cell phone and camera, like it would
allow the search of other closed containers in the vehicle.” 31 This
conclusion was followed immediately by a footnote distinguishing
Kramer—on which the defendant relied—because it did not
consider the Fourth Amendment implications of the
computer/cellphone unification.
This double standard has not gone unnoticed by Fourth
Amendment scholars. “If current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
is extended to its logical conclusion, officers who arrest drivers for
traffic infractions will be permitted to search the call histories, text
messages, email, photos, movies, and Internet browsing history on
iPhones with no suspicion of wrongdoing whatsoever.” 32 In fact,
the same line of reasoning would also permit the examination of
the history of a GPS device found in, or built into, a car. Because
this area of jurisprudence is currently growing and developing, it
remains to be seen whether these concerns will come to fruition,
but they certainly mark one possible trend of the unfolding
interface of the Fourth Amendment and portable technology.
C. Searches Incident to Arrest
Outside the context of automobiles, the permissibility of
searches incident to arrest centers on the safety of officers.
Because this standard is narrower than the automotive exception, it
will be much less likely to cover the search of a cellphone, and its
it because the search of Burgess' hard drives was authorized by a warrant.”
Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1090.
31
U.S. v. Stringer, 2011 WL 3847026, *9 (W.D. Missouri July 20, 2011).
32
Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56
UCLA L. REV. 27, 27 (2008).
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bounds generally preclude a search of an arrestee’s cellphone’s
memory.
The Supreme Court has clearly delineated the reasons for
warrantless searches incident to arrest. “The exception [to a
general requirement for a warrant] derives from interests in officer
safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in
arrest situations.” 33 The dangers in both categories are clear. A
weapon in an arrestee’s control can harm the arresting officer,
other officers, or other arrestees, and evidence left in an arrestee’s
possession can easily be damaged or destroyed before recovered
during booking. Neither category offers purchase for a warrantless
search of either computers or cellphones conducted incident to
arrest.
Courts place extreme importance on the intent of the officer in
searches incident to arrest. If the search was conducted for officer
safety, the evidence will likely be permitted. In other
circumstances, the Northern District of California struck down a
search of defendants’ cellphones conducted subsequent to arrest
because the “[o]fficers did not search the phones out of a concern
for officer safety, or to prevent the concealment or destruction of
evidence. Instead, the purpose was purely investigatory. Once the
officers lawfully seized defendants' cellular phones, officers could
have sought a warrant to search the contents of the cellular
phones.” 34 As a practical matter, it is unlikely that officer safety
would ever justify a search of a cellphone’s memory.
Similarly, cellphone memory is generally long-lasting and
robust, thereby preserving evidence which does not offer sufficient
reason to protect a warrantless search of an arrestee’s cellphone. In
State v. Smith 35, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected a search of a
cellphone made subsequent to arrest on the grounds that the
Government failed to show that any of its data faced imminent
deletion or destruction and that it could not be found any other
way. 36 Much like the Supreme Court of Ohio, the Northern District
33

Arizona v. Grant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009).
U.S. v. Park, 2007 WL 1521573, *8 (N.D. California May 23, 2007).
35
920 N.E. 2d 949 (Ohio 2009)
36
See THOMAS K. CLANEY, CYBER CRIME AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE:
MATERIALS AND CASES 187 (2011). There are potential situations where
34
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of California placed cellphones outside the reach of warrantless
searches incident to arrest; “a cellular phone should not be
characterized as an element of individual's clothing or person, but
rather as a ‘possession[ ] within an arrestee's immediate control
[that has] fourth amendment [sic] protection at the station
house.’” 37
CONCLUSION
The word “computer” has a myriad of meanings depending on
the context in which it is used. The choice of the meaning has a
substantive effect on the legal framework applied to the object in
question. In the sentencing context, for example, “computer” has
the broad meaning under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
which can then result in the use of a simple cellphone rendering a
defendant eligible for a sentencing enhancement. On the other
hand, sometimes courts look past terminology to the functional
aspects of the device in question, often traditional doctrines such as
the closed container doctrine. Even in these contexts, however,
some courts treat cellphones and computers much differently,
typically to a defendant’s detriment.
What devices can be searched, in what manner, and when are
evolving areas of the law. One can only “speculate whether the
Supreme Court would treat laptop computers, hard drives, flash
drives or even cell phones as it has a briefcase or give those types
of devices preferred status because of their unique ability to hold
vast amounts of diverse personal information.” 38 In the meantime,
the mixed judicial reactions to the evidentiary implications of the
word “computer” can offer advantage to both sides in criminal
cases.

evidence on a cellphone could be destroyed if not investigated at the time of
arrest, they are not identifiable ex ante by an officer at the scene. One would be
an iPhone that can be remotely wiped by someone with its associated iCloud
account password. Determining whether such data will be deleted is impossible
to tell before it begins.
37
U.S. v. Park, 2007 WL 1521573, *8 (N.D. California May 23, 2007)
(quoting U.S. v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1290 (9th Cir. 1981)).
38
U.S. v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1090 (10th Cir. 2009).
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PRACTICE POINTERS


Prosecutors: Point to instances where courts have been
widely permissive of searches of new technologies,
especially cellphones.



Defenders: Point to the fact that a cellphone or other pieces
of new technology often hold as much intimate information
about an individual as a computer. They should, therefore,
be extended the same protection.
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